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How Supreme Court Precedent Sheds Light on 
Corporate Bill of Attainder Claims 
By: Alina Veneziano, LLM; JD* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The propriety of big-tech corporations to receive constitutional rights to 
the same extent as a natural person is heavily debated. This topic has 
become especially apparent in light of the Huawei case, where Huawei 
Technologies sued the United States claiming that its ban on Huawei 
products was unconstitutional1 because it violated the U.S Bill of Attainder 
Clause. The Bill of Attainder Clause prohibits the legislature from passing a 
law that declares an individual or group of individuals guilty of a crime 
without a judicial trial.2 In response, the U.S. government claimed that 
Huawei products posed a national security risk to the intelligence of U.S. 
systems, which was precisely the reason it banned Huawei products in the 
2019 National Defense Authorization Act.3 
To better understand how and under what circumstances the Bill of 
Attainder Clause applies to a corporate entity, an examination of how the 
Supreme Court has extended other constitutional guarantees to corporations 
is warranted. The Supreme Court has extended certain constitutional 
 
* Alina Veneziano, Ph.D. Candidate at King’s College London, UK; LL.M., New York 
University School of Law, 2019; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 2018; 
M.B.A., Western Governors University; B.S., Accounting, Western Governors 
University. Ms. Veneziano is a member of the Bar of the State of New York. 
1 Complaint, Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd. v. United States, 440 F. Supp.3d 607 (E.D. Tex. 
2019) (No. 4-19-cv-00159). 
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law will be 
passed.”). 
3 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. 
No. 115-232, § 889, 132 Stat. 1636 (2018). 
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guarantees to corporations such as the criminal jury trial guarantee. In some 
cases, the Court has declined to extend other guarantees including the right 
against self-incrimination. However, issues regarding Bill of Attainder 
claims’ applicability to corporations have yet to come before the Court. The 
reason for the Court’s decision that some constitutional guarantees are 
inapplicable to corporations is because those guarantees are considered 
individual and personal rights, and therefore cannot be asserted by 
corporations. 
This brief article urges that corporate Bill of Attainder claims cannot be 
applicable to corporations because such claims are not personal rights and 
cannot be relied upon by corporate entities. Part II outlines which 
constitutional rights are applicable to corporations, which are not, and 
which are undecided. Part III analogizes the approach the Supreme Court 
has used for other constitutional guarantees for corporations and applies it 
to the Bill of Attainder Clause. Part IV presents the conclusion. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS REGARDING CORPORATE 
EXTENSIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES 
The Judicial Branch has experienced difficulty deciding corporate Bill of 
Attainder claims due to the artificial nature of the corporation.4 
Nevertheless, this difficult task rests solely with the Judiciary.5 Here, the 
Court has adopted an approach of selective incorporation regarding the 
extension of constitutional guarantees to the corporate entity. Examples of 
constitutional provisions that the Court has extended to the corporation 
include the Contract Clause,6 the Takings Clause,7 the Sixth Amendment 
 
4 See Charles O’Kelley, The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social 
and Political Expression and the Corporation After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 
GEO. L.J. 1347, 1348 (1979). 
5 See id. 
6 See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819). 
7 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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criminal jury trial guarantee,8 the Fourth Amendment freedom from 
unreasonable searches and seizures,9 the Fifth10 and Fourteenth11 
Amendment Due Process Clauses, the Fourteenth Amendment Equal 
Protection Clause,12 the Fifth Amendment protection against double 
jeopardy,13 and the First Amendment rights to religious freedoms14 and free 
speech.15 Certain constitutional guarantees that the Court has held to be 
inapplicable to the corporation include the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause in Article IV16 and the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.17 The Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the right to 
grand jury indictment for corporations, but lower courts have held that this 
guarantee is not applicable to them.18 Similarly, the Supreme Court has 
never decided whether the Eighth Amendment applies to corporations and 
has refused to do so where the outcome of the case did not turn on such a 
determination.19 
 
8 See Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994); 
see also Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975). 
9 See generally Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); see also Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 
436 U.S. 307 (1978). 
10 See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); see also 
Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165 (1893). 
11 See Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889). 
12 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985); see also Santa Clara Cty. v. S. 
Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
13 See United States. v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572 (1977). 
14 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
15 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also First 
Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
16 See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839); see also Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 
168 (1868). 
17 See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988); see also Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 
43, 75 (1906); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911). 
18 United States v. Macklin, 389 F.Supp. 272, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (“The corporate 
defendants . . . are not subject to any term of imprisonment if convicted of the charges 
against them. Accordingly, the charges against them are not ‘infamous’ within the 
meaning of the fifth amendment.”). 
19 Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 n.22 (1989) 
(“We shall not decide whether the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines 
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When analyzing when, why, and under what circumstances a specific 
constitutional guarantee ought to extend to the corporate entity, the Court 
separates the purpose of each constitutional provision. It then analyzes the 
propriety of corporate extension of that provision. 
For instance, the Court in Dartmouth College held that the Contracts 
Clause applies to corporations. In so holding, Chief Justice Marshall noted 
that the corporate entity is “an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and 
existing only in contemplation of law.”20 It possesses only those rights in 
the charter conferred upon it by the state, and even though the corporate 
entity is immortal, it possesses no more political power or no more of a 
political character than would a natural person.21 Among some of these 
powers that effectuate the purpose of the Contracts Clause include the 
ability to “manage [the corporation’s] own affairs, and to hold property.”22 
On this point, commentaries have observed that the Contracts Clause 
promotes “voluntary private relations,” and because corporations have 
purposes that are means to ends—some of which involve private 
contracting—it would be illogical to deny corporations the power conferred 
via their charters to achieve those ends by refusing to extend the guarantees 
of the Contracts Clause.23 In other words, the purpose of the Contracts 
Clause is not an individualistic one. Confining its protections only to 
natural persons would not serve to effectuate its purpose to ensure voluntary 
private relationships and contracting. 
Where there is no reason why the constitutional guarantee at issue needs 
to be limited to natural persons to effectuate the guarantee’s purpose, that 
guarantee should also be applicable to corporations. Similarly, there was no 
 
applies to the several States through the Fourteenth Amendment, nor shall we decide 
whether the Eighth Amendment protects corporations as well as individuals.”). 
20 See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives 
from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1504–05 (1989). 
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distinction drawn as to why the Fourth Amendment guarantee against 
unreasonable searches and seizures should be different for individuals 
compared to corporations. The Court in Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc. noted 
that “the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment protects commercial 
buildings as well as private homes” and that to hold otherwise, “would belie 
the origin of that Amendment, and the American colonial experience.”24 At 
times, the Supreme Court did not even entertain arguments on whether 
there should be a distinction between individuals and corporations 
regarding some constitutional guarantees. In Santa Clara County, for 
example, the Court noted that it did not want to hear arguments on whether 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to 
corporations since “[w]e are all of opinion that it does.”25 Similarly, the 
purpose of the First Amendment’s freedom of speech is to promote the 
spread of ideas and protected speech without fear of punishment. In 
Citizens United, the Court asserted that “[c]orporations and other 
associations, like individuals, contribute to the ‘discussion, debate, and the 
dissemination of information and ideas’ that the First Amendment seeks to 
foster.”26 The speaker of the communication is irrelevant when considering 
the protections provided by the First Amendment’s freedom of speech 
clause. 
A similar approach can be observed with respect to rights that the 
Supreme Court has refused to extend or to acknowledge as applicable to 
corporations. For example, the purpose of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause in Article IV is to guarantee citizens the same rights and protections 
under the law no matter where they are in the United States. In Bank of 
Augusta v. Earle, the Court observed how corporate extension here would 
not serve this purpose. “[C]orporations are neither persons nor partners, but 
 
24 Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978). 
25 Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886). 
26 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010) (quoting First 
Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)). 
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artificial bodies politic, created by act of state . . . .”27 The Court continued 
by stating that “[t]he only rights [a corporation] can claim are the rights 
which are given to it.”28 Thus, corporate extension of this guarantee to give 
the corporate entity both the privileges and liabilities entitled to citizens29 
would not advance the purpose of the Privileges and Immunities Clause due 
to these special privileges of corporations. It would also be inconsistent 
with the corporation’s special privileges, as the Court observed, for the 
corporate entity to have both the privileges and the liabilities—such as 
obligations—entitled to citizens.30 
Additionally, the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination 
has not been extended to corporations because to do so would not serve the 
purpose of this provision, which is to “respect[] a private inner sanctum of 
individual feeling and thought” by forbidding intrusion “to extract self-
condemnation.”31 The Court has noted that the purpose of preventing 
compulsory self-disclosure of information is to protect “individual civil 
liberties,” and therefore could not have been intended “to protect economic 
or other interests of [the corporate entity] so as to nullify appropriate 
governmental regulations.”32 Lastly, to briefly comment on the Eighth 
Amendment, its purposes are to prohibit excessive fines, physical torture, 
and certain jail conditions. Even though the Court has left open the question 
of applicability of this Amendment to corporations,33 it has noted that the 
basic purpose of the Eighth Amendment is “nothing less than the dignity of 
 
27 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 584 (1839). 
28 Id. at 587. 
29 Id. at 586. 
30 Id. (“If . . . members of a corporation were to be regarded as individuals carrying on 
business in their corporate name, and therefore entitled to the privileges of citizens . . . 
they must at the same time take upon themselves the liabilities of citizens,” an approach 
inconsistent with the corporation’s special privileges.). 
31 Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91 (1974) (quoting Couch v. U.S., 409 U.S. 322, 
327 (1973)). 
32 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944). 
33 Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 n.22 (1989). 
How Supreme Court Precedent Sheds Light on Corporate Bill of Attainder Claims
 35 
VOLUME 19 • ISSUE 1 • 2020 
man.”34 Further, it is obvious that a corporation cannot be held in jail 
pending trial nor physically tortured due to the corporation’s lack of a 
physical body and ability to perceive pain and cruelty. Thus, the speaker of 
the statement is relevant for purposes of the Fifth Amendment’s protection 
against self-incrimination. 
Thus, in analyzing whether a constitutional provision applies to 
corporations, the Supreme Court has adopted a broad trend of determining 
the essential purpose of each constitutional provision.35 This phenomenon is 
significant because it focuses on the constitutional right at issue. In other 
words, the Court is not as concerned with who or what the constitutional 
right was historically applied to or against as it is with the “historical 
purpose of the provision and [then] whether corporate protection serves that 
purpose.”36 Thus, two questions need to be answered: (1) what is the basic 
purpose of the Bill of Attainder Clause?; and (2) does extension of that 
guarantee to the corporate entity serve that purpose? 
III. APPLYING THE SUPREME COURT’S APPROACH TO THE BILL OF 
ATTAINDER CLAUSE 
Corporations can convey property, enter into contracts, and sue and be 
sued, just as an individual is able to do so. But while these rights work for 
corporations despite their claimed individual nature, there are some other 
 
34 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). 
35 First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978) (“Whether or not 
a particular guarantee is ‘purely personal’ or is unavailable to corporations for some other 
reason depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitutional 
provision.”); see also Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 
163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 110–11 (2014) (arguing that constitutional analysis is not based 
on the “nature of different types of entities” so much as it is based on “examining the 
purposes of the particular constitutional right”); see also Karey P. Pond, Constitutional 
LawThe Telecommunications Act of 1996: When Legislative Regulation Becomes 
Unconstitutional Punishment, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 271, 307 (2000) (contending that 
“whether a corporation is entitled to the protection of a constitutional guarantee depends 
on the nature of the guarantee at issue.”). 
36 Pond, supra note 35, at 309. 
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individual rights that do not make sense for a corporation to possess such as 
the right to marry, the right to privacy, or the right to vote. But what about 
constitutional rights? Which constitutional rights make sense for individuals 
but not for corporations? For instance, as noted above, corporations enjoy a 
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures 
but do not have a Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. 
Additionally, corporations have the constitutional protection against double 
jeopardy of the Fifth Amendment but not the protection against the 
excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment clauses of the Eighth 
Amendment. The Court has made these determinations by examining the 
purpose of the relevant constitutional guarantees and then by asking 
whether those purposes would be consistent with extension of those 
guarantees to corporations. 
What about the Bill of Attainder Clause of the U.S. Constitution? The 
purpose of the Bill of Attainder Clause is not analogizable to the purpose of 
the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech, which has been afforded 
to corporations. The essential purpose of the free speech guarantee is to 
foster the dissemination of protected speech to the public. Even though the 
corporation cannot speak, “its business requires individual speech.”37 But 
the human character of the disseminator is irrelevant for the essential 
purpose of the right to be manifested and fulfilled. This is not an example of 
a constitutional guarantee that is personal to each individual and is therefore 
not an individual right. 
However, the purpose of the Bill of Attainder Clause is analogizable to 
the purpose of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. They 
are both individualistic rights. The Fifth Amendment’s purpose is “that of 
protecting personal privacy.”38 But whose personal privacy? In 1944, the 
Supreme Court held that this privilege is a personal one and applies only to 
 
37 O’Kelley, supra note 4, at 1360. 
38 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 399 (1976). 
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“natural individuals,” and therefore, not to corporations.39 In Bellotti, the 
Court analogized the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to 
“‘purely personal’ guarantees” and noted that these guarantees were 
unavailable to corporations because the “historic function” limited 
protection to individuals.40 Further, corporate Fifth Amendment rights 
would impair government investigations.41 As scholars have rightly 
observed, a corporation attempting to invoke the right against self-
incrimination would be like an individual refusing to speak to the police 
under the Fifth Amendment right by claiming that their statement would 
incriminate someone else.42 Extension of the Clause to corporations would 
not fit with the approach the Supreme Court has used in determining which 
guarantees belong to corporations. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The applicability of the Bill of Attainder Clause to corporations is a 
tricky issue. Huawei’s ability to claim and support its arguments based on a 
violation of this Clause is problematic because the Supreme Court has never 
addressed whether the Bill of Attainder Clause is applicable to corporate 
entities. But analyzing the Supreme Court’s precedent regarding which 
constitutional guarantees are applicable to corporations and why such rights 
are applicable reveals a simple analogy: if the constitutional guarantee in 
question is a personal, individualistic right, it does not belong to and cannot 
be relied upon by the corporate entity. 
Therefore, to answering the two questions posed at the end of Part II: (1) 
the basic purpose of the Bill of Attainder Clause is to protect individuals 
from punishment and prevent legislative determinations of guilt; and (2) 
 
39 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698–99 (1944). 
40 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14. 
41 See Garrett, supra note 35, at 130. 
42 Id. (“One person cannot refuse to speak to police under the Fifth Amendment by 
asserting the potential to incriminate another person.”). 
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corporate extension of the guarantee of the Bill of Attainder Clause would 
not serve this purpose. Because of this, the Supreme Court should address, 
as soon as possible, that the Bill of Attainder Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution is a personal right that is wholly inapplicable to the corporate 
entity. Once the Supreme Court makes such a determination, Huawei’s bill 
of attainder claim will be rightfully mooted. 
 
